Sunday, 23 September 2007

Monthly Report

Again, a very successful month for TPN, even though we haven;t been posting much. People from 36 countries and 119 cities have visited the site. The list is as follows:
UK (55.21%)
US (11.79%)
China (7.47%)
Canada (6.09%)
Malaysia (3.93%)
France (2.36%)
Singapore (2.36%)
Turkey (0.98%)
UAE (0.79%)
Vietnam (0.79%
Poland (0.79%)
Switzerland (0.59%)
India (0.59%)
Mexico (0.59%)
South Korea (0.39%)
Sweden (0.39%)
Germany (0.39%)
Pakistan (0.39%)
Spain (0.39%)
Australia (0.39%)
(not set) (0.39%)
Phillipines (0.20%)
Argentina (0.20%)
Lebanon (0.20%)
Iraq (0.20%)
Hungary (0.20%)
Italy (0.20%)
Brazil (0.20%)
Romania (0.20%)
Egypt (0.20%)
Colombia (0.20%)
Japan (0.20%)
Puerto Rico (0.20%)
Norway (0.20%)
Estonia (0.20%)
Ghana (0.20%)

119 cities involve:
London, UK (29.47%)
(not set) (6.68%)
Birmingham, UK (5.11%)
Hangzhou, Chi (4.72%)
KL, Mal (2.95%)
Toronto, Can (2.55%)
Singapore, Sing (2.36%)
Milton Keynes, UK (2.16%)
Ann Arbor, Iraq (1.96%)
Lyon, Fra (1.77%)
West Lothian, UK (1.57%)
Montreal, Can (1.57%)
Gateshead, UK (1.18%)
Manchester, Uk (1.18%)
Cumbenauld, UK (1.18%)
LA, US (0.98%)
Bejing, Chi 0.98%
Reading,UK (0.79%)
Thames Ditton, UK (0.79%)
Shanghai, Chi (0.79%)
Basildon, UK (0.79%)
Brentford, UK (0.59%)
Suzhou, Chi (0.59%)
Warzaw, Pol (0.59%)
Chapeltown, SA (0.59%)
Newcastle, UK (0.59%)
Sheffield (0.59%)
Atlanta, US (0.59%)
Seoul, SK (0.59%)
Etobicoke, Ethi (0.39%)
Istanbul, Tur (0.39%)
Stockholm, Swe (0.39%)
San Francisco, US (0.39%)
Dubayy, UAE (0.39%)
Chicago, US (0.39%)
Austin, US (0.39%)
Lahore, Pak (0.39%)
Hamar, Iraq (0.20%)
Hesperia, US (0.20%)
Irving, US (0.20%)
Gardner, US(0.20%)
Ankara, Tur (0.20%)
Ypsilanti, US (0.20%)
Ponce, Cuba (0.20%)
Matamoros, Egp (0.20%)
Ottawa, Can (0.20%)
Bucharest, Rom (0.20%)
Keland, Chi (0.20%)
Washington, US (0.20%)
Portland, US (0.20%)
Stapleford, UK (0.20%)
Zurich, Swiz (0.20%)
Carlisle, US (0.20%)
Medelin, Fra (0.20%)
Irvinem US (0.20%)
Melbourne, Aus (0.20%)
Beirut, Leb (0.20%)
Gdansk, Pol (0.20%)
Kuching, Tur (0.20%)
Bletchley, UK (0.20%)
St Mary's , UK (0.20%)
Chevy Chase, UK (0.20%)
Long Island City, US (0.20%)
Salvador, Mex (0.20%)
Monterry, US (0.20%)
Dartford, US (0.20%)
Boston, US (0.20%)
Rochester, US (0.20%)
Adelaide, Aus (0.20%)
Mansfield, US (0.20%)
Bryan, US (0.20%)
Oxford, UK (0.20%)
Oxford, US (0.20%)
East York, US (0.20%)
Chicopee, US (0.20%)
Poplar, US (0.20%)
Weehawken, US (0.20%)
Binghamton, US (0.20%)
New York, UK (0.20%)
Barcelona, Spa (0.20%)
Kitchener, US (0.20%)
Guadalajara, Mex (0.20%)
Colorade Springs, US (0.20%)
Tallinn, US (0.20%)
West Lafayette, US (0.20%)
Palm Springs, US (0.20%)
Bristol, UK (0.20%)
Mahape, Col (0.20%)
Adana, Tur (0.20%)
North Shields, UK (0.20%)
Baghdad, Ira (0.20%)
Addison, US (0.20%)
Sale, UK (0.20%)
Albany, US (0.20%)
Mississauga, US (0.20%)
Miami, US (0.20%)
Wembley, UK (0.20%)
Vilonia, Fra (0.20%)
Tianjin, Chi (0.20%)
Ames, ? (0.20%)
Cebu, Egy (0.20%)
Dallas, US (0.20%)
Tokyo, Jap (0.20%)
Wohlen, US (0.20%)
Hull, UK (0.20%)
El Segundo, Mex (0.20%)
Pune, Col (0.20%)
Dumfries, UK (0.20%)
Foshan, Chi (0.20%)
Middlesbrough, UK (0.20%)
Charlotte, US (0.20%)
Budapest, Rom (0.20%)
Gaithersburg, Sweden (0.20%)
Upper Darby, US (0.20%)
La Coruna, Spa (0.20%)
Nashville, US (0.20%)
Geneva, Swiz (0.20%)
Munich, Ger (0.20%)

Sunday, 16 September 2007

Iraq: If you break it, you own it

When the Americans launched the disastrously planned and ironically named “Operation Iraqi Freedom” more than four years ago, the only enemy they anticipated was the Iraqi army, a military force in name only. Mostly made up of conscripted Shias who were more inclined to shoot their general rather then any invader, the Iraqi Armed Forces were far from the potent military machine Saddam Hussein created to face the Iranians in the 1980’s. Its nuclear ambitions had long been stunted, first by the 1981 Israeli air strike on the Osirak nuclear reactor, and later by back to back regional conflicts. Its chemical weapons, put to good use against Kurds and Iranian troops, had for the most part been destroyed by UN weapons inspectors or had expired. The Army’s infrastructure had been devastated by repeated wars, and the decade long UN sanctions crippled any rearmament efforts. So it was no surprise when the American troops faced more defections then resistance as it strolled into Baghdad.
Second Phase
Soon after, we were introduced to the second phase of fighting in Iraq, courtesy of the Iraqi insurgency. At the time, few in the West were familiar with the assortment of tribes, sects, ethnicities and factions that made up the resistance. Initially dismissed as the work of rogues and remnants of the previous regime, it wasn’t long before the insurgency had become an Iraqi institution. Over time, we became familiar with the Zawahiris and the Sadrs, the Saddamists and the Jihadists.
Unfortunately, we also became more familiar with a rising civilian body count as central Iraq burned day and night. Lost in the midst of Mission Accomplished banners and beheading videos were quiet developments occurring in the streets of Baghdad. Bodies were being turned into Baghdad morgues that displayed neither the marks of a shootout victim nor a casualty of air strikes. Day after day, a climate of fear began taking over Sunni neighbourhoods, as an increasing number of former Baathist officials began disappearing.
Third Phase
Having failed to anticipate an insurgency, the incompetent Pentagon brass could hardly have been expected to anticipate what began 4 years ago and continues unabated today: the vengeance of the Shias. Long oppressed and marginalized by Saddam’s Sunni regime (and for centuries prior by the Ottomans), the majority Shia had been emancipated and now relished the opportunity to settle scores. In the Middle East, where honour and pride is worth more than life itself to the patriarchal tribal society, vengeance is a cultural institution. Skirmishes became gun battles, gun battles became all out assaults. And when the second of two bombs went off at the Al Askari Shia shrine in Basra on that fateful February day in 2006, all hell broke loose. Mosques attacked, preachers and priests killed, the indiscriminate targeting of civilians, the ethnic cleansing of neighbourhoods, the forming of militias and the complete breakdown of law and order followed in the next few months. The success of the Shia death squads led to increasingly desperate tactics by the outgunned and outnumbered Sunnis; car bombs in market places, suicide bombings at festivals and even attacks on religious and funeral processions. The third phase of fighting in Iraq had set dangerous new precedents.
Fourth Phase
It seems as if things couldn’t get any worse in Iraq. US troops are stuck in what is increasingly seen as an unwinnable quagmire while the political climate in Washington and London is not as favourable to the war as it once was. Nouri al Maliki’s governing coalition has lost its Sunni partners, all governmental institutions are either despised or distrusted and Baghdad has become inner city Los Angeles on steroids. The Turks are licking their chops in the north, eager to set its troops on the Kurdish peshmergas, while not a day goes by without a US official repeating claims of Iranian interference in Iraq. And yet, things are getting worse. The next chapter of the Iraq war is sure to be bloodier than the previous. A fourth dimension of Iraq fighting has emerged: inter-sect warfare.
Last week another 50-60 Iraqis were killed in the southern holy city of Karbala, as the Shia celebrated the birth of their last Imam. Two years ago such an attack would have led to finger pointing and condemnation of Al Qaeda and other likeminded extremist Sunnis.
Inter Shia Strife
We now know that the casualties were the result of a gun battle between the two largest Shia militias in Iraq: the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades. The two groups have a rivalry that extends to the upper echelon of its leadership. The Mahdi Army is led by Moqtada Al Sadr, while the Badr Brigades are the military wing of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC) led by Abdul Aziz al Hakim. The Hakim-Sadr rivalry goes back decades, as both families have jostled for leadership of the Iraqi Shia community. Both factions received support from Iran, although the SIIC curries more favour in Tehran (the SIIC was based out of Iran for years while Saddam was in power). While Sadr has crafted a popular image of himself as a firebrand cleric opposed to the occupation, the SIIC has sought political power from the onset of the war and has deeply integrated itself within the government, both politically and militarily (including heavy infiltration of the government’s security apparatus). Thus, Sadr remains a populist, appealing to the poor and impoverished while the SIIC represents the new Shia establishment. The Mahdi Army-SIIC rivalry now exists in Baghdad and the entire Shia south, where both groups are vying for power. Further contributing to the deteriorating situation in the south, is the imminent withdrawal of British troops from the region as well as the close proximity of Basra and surrounding regions (which is responsible for more than half of Iraq’s oil) to the Iranian border. Criminal gangs, with no specific political affiliation, also command great strength.
Inter Sunni Strife
Until recently, the Sunni insurgency maintained a united front in the face of their two major threats, the Americans and the Shias. However, developments in the last two years have led to a schism within the Sunni resistance, as both sides attempt to consolidate their power over the Iraqi Sunni community. In general terms, the conflict within the community is between a radical internationalist jihad movement with local support and a more nationalist Iraqi based resistance. The former is headed by the Islamic State in Iraq, while the latter movement is being championed by the Reform and Jihad Front (RJF). The Islamic State in Iraq is an attempt by Al Qaeda in Iraq to create a quasi government, with ministries and a leadership committee called the Mujahideen Shura Council. The group itself is an amalgamation of Al Qaeda and several smaller groups that share Al Qaeda’s extremist Salafi ideology. The Islamic State in Iraq is made up of both foreign fighters as well as local networks of support. Initially supported by the other Sunni insurgent groups for its tactical success in the battlefield against the Americans, the ISI has since alienated many Sunnis from its cause as a result of its ideology and actions. The ISI has branded Iraq’s Shia community as heretics and government supporters, and has thus targeted the community with indiscriminate attacks that have taken the lives of thousands of civilians. Not only are the secreterian attacks frowned upon by many other Sunni insurgents, but Shia reprisals usually occur against Sunni villages and neighbourhoods. Furthermore, the Islamic State of Iraq has attempted to impose its harsh interpretation of Islamic law in the Sunni heartland, targeting those who attempt to oppose its consolidation of power. The arrogance and insensitivity of the foreigners has led to the creation of a more nationalist, pragmatist Sunni insurgent coalition.
The Reform and Jihad Front is a coalition led by the Islamic Army of Iraq, one of the biggest insurgent groups and a onetime ally of Al Qaeda. Primarily consisting of native Iraqis, the RJF are less inclined to take part in secretarian acts of violence and seek to protect the interests of the Sunni community within the existing framework (the current government). Thus, there have been some degree of communication at the political level between the Iraqi government and the RJF, a though that is tantamount to betrayal for the more hardcore ISI. While the Sunni insurgency overwhelmingly opposed the government in the beginning of the war, a vast number of Sunnis have realized that they live in a new Iraq, where their community has become a minority, and thus political integration is a necessary evil. Initial attempts to suppress inter-Sunni rivalries have failed miserably, and both sides have openly declared the other an enemy.
The Tribes
The extremist ideology of the Islamic State in Iraq leaves no room for flexibility, negotiation and reform. All who oppose their viewpoints are declared an obstacle to their organization. As a result, local Sunnis who have objected to the group’s hardcore initiatives and military tactics have felt the wrath. In an attempt to stifle dissent, as well as create a power vacuum that they can fill, the ISI has targeted local Sunni tribal chiefs who have opposed their administration. After dozens of assassinations and casualties, the Sunni tribes of central Iraq have created their own military organizations to specifically counter the Al Qaeda threat. In the Sunni Al Anbar province - home of the Sunni insurgency - the tribes have created the Anbar Salvation Council (ASC). The full complexities of the Iraq war is best exemplified by the fact that the American government now actively arms the same tribes that it once targeted. The enemy of my enemy is my friend, indeed. The successes of the ASC has translated into similar organizations sprouting all over the Sunni heartland, most recently in Diyala province with the establishment of the Diyala Salvation Front.
Conclusion
Although the Americans may be pleased that the Sunni and Shia insurgency it once struggled to contain has split, one must not be too optimistic. Iran holds a great deal of influence over the Iraqi Shia community, and is in a position to facilitate a reconciliation between the rival factions. In regards to the Sunni strife, the Iraqi government has been less than enthusiastic about arming the Sunni tribes, even if it means the defeat of Al Qaeda. While the Sunni insurgents consider Al Qaeda its foremost enemy now, the Shia and American threat has not been ignored. There are legitimate fears in both Baghdad and Washington, that the same tribes and groups it supports now, will turn on it as soon as Al Qaeda is defeated. Furthermore, the inter-sect conflicts have contributed to a further polarization of the Iraqi people, and a greater militarization of the populace. When the Americans broke the Iraqi piƱata, they misjudged what would emerge from within it.
Anticipating a supportive and willing populace, they now face a multitude of enemies and allies whose trust today cannot be ensured tomorrow. Perhaps this situation is what Colin Powell referred to, when he told President Bush pre war, that having owned Iraq, the United States would inherit all its problems. “If you break it, you own it”, the saying goes. The Americans would love to clean up this mess but it may be too late. Besides, even if they could, it remains to be seen whether the Iraqis themselves will let them.

By Abdul Karim

Columbia: The Never Ending Story

America’s insistence on a militaristic approach in the 1990’s has not only harmed any multilateral approach to resolving the conflict, but has exasperated the violent status quo in Columbia.
For nearly four decades, war has raged across Colombia. It is the forgotten war, the war that has existed for so long; its continued eternal existence is assumed. Long after the flames of other Latin American civil conflicts have been extinguished, the Colombian inferno continues to burn. It is the longest running conflict in the world today, and its continual perpetuation boggles the mind. Although there have been multilateral efforts to stop the war and promote negotiations, these efforts have been hampered and delegitimized by America’s role as regional super power and de facto Colombian power broker for the last six decades. The relationship between international institutions such as the UN and the Colombian government has been less then solid, and the ability of the UN to interfere in Colombia has been severely restricted.
There is a sharp difference between the interests of the Americans in Colombia and the desires of the international community advocating a multilateral approach. This divergence of interests reflects two theoretical perspectives. The Americans, with their policy of State involvement and looking after geopolitical interests have pursued policies with a realist perspective, whereas the international community, notably the European Union in seeking to mediate the conflict have assumed a more idealist view point.
The current American foreign policy towards Colombia - in the form of “Plan Colombia” and in conjunction with its Colombian government allies - sustains the current violence and prolongs the conflict with its militaristic approach. This policy is based on American geopolitical strategies and interests, and as a result prevents any viable multilateral approach from taking place. It is only when the lone superpower decides to relinquish authority and compromise its influence that a united multilateral push for peace can be achieved. The United States must understand that if conflict still rages in Colombia after four decades, then the attitudes and approaches to that nation must be drastically altered to prevent further deterioration and disaster.
A brief history of the conflict is necessary to situate our arguments within a broader context. The Colombian civil war began in the late 1960’s. Over the course of the last four decades, the war, its actors and the mechanisms by which the war was fought (as well as external factors) has evolved drastically. A clear, fluid, transitional, historical review of the war will not serve much good as the Colombian State and its rebel enemies as well as the nation’s international standing has changed. However, the root causes of the conflict still to this day remain because it has never been addressed by the Colombian State. More than 65% of the citizens of Colombia live in poverty. Furthermore, 30% of landowners control more than 90% of the land.
The conflict began when leftist activists sympathetic with Maoist/Communist ideology began rebelling against the State in the late 60’s. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was established in 1966 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. The National Liberation Army (ELN) was formed in the 1960’s, inspired by the actions of Fidel Castro in Cuba. Together, these militant groups seeked to establish a communist State in Colombia and have sought to do so by force of arms over the last four decades. Together, they currently control half of the country. More than half of the nation’s mayors support or obey them. Their administration of area under their control includes regulation of laws, execution of criminal justice, patrolling the roads and highways, and other forms of governance.
The Cold War was fought between the United States and the Soviet Union all over the world and South America was no exception. The US policy in South America was guided primarily by one objective: the containment and suppression of communism. This involved support of anti communist regimes and active involvement in the affairs of other States to eradicate any leftist, socialist movements that would upset the anti communist balance of power. Examples of this Cold War policy include the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile (1973) and the support for anti-leftist “contras” in Nicaragua (1980’s). In Colombia, the United States has been instrumental in the State’s battles against the FARC/ELN since the conflict began. Although the extent of American involvement has differed throughout the last four decades, the main components of American policy have remained intact, namely financial and military aid for the Colombian State.
The latest chapter in this conflict has been the American governments re-energized efforts to become more involved in the Colombian affair. This increased involvement started in the late 1990’s when President Bill Clinton introduced “Plan Colombia”, a coordinated effort by the American and Colombian regimes to crack down on the leftist militants through increased aid and military assistance. “Plan Colombia” promotes a military approach to the conflict, and its proponents believe violence will bring stability to Colombia. Think a scaled down Marshall Plan - except, replace aid with guns.
“Plan Colombia” was designed to increase stability and order in Colombia, however its supporters believe this can only be achieved after the conflict is resolved militarily. A new consensus had emerged in Washington that neither alternative development nor political, economic, or judicial reform is possible in Colombia until the State first starts providing permanent security throughout the country, which is three times the size of California. Doing so, however, will require a massive counterinsurgency campaign. Once American money, equipment, and advisers headed to Colombia, it would be only a matter of time before the United States began openly supporting the counterinsurgency campaign against the FARC and the ELN. The establishment of geopolitical spheres of influence (South America as America’s backyard), recognition of policy objectives based on State centered “interests” (containing non friendly communist movements) and overt militaristic approach to solving these issues reflects the realist bent of American foreign policy.
“Plan Colombia” was accepted by the Colombian government but the region was less willing to embrace such a policy. The U.S. effort to build regional support for a military campaign in Colombia is further complicated by skepticism about Washington’s motivation for expanding its already significant military presence. The U.S. armed forces are widely regarded as having been complicit in years of repression. Given the extreme weakness of democracy in the region, legitimate fear exists across the continent that if Washington makes stronger ties to local militaries a priority, it will only strengthen the very institutions that are most associated with the authoritarian rule of recent decades.
The United States may espouse democratic ideals and values and even be willing to go to war to defend them; however it has no qualms about restricting it to further their interests. Similarly, while the United States may publicly call for respect for human rights, its track record in Colombia suggests otherwise. In a conflict marred by gross human rights violations committed by militias on both sides of the conflict, no form of American involvement would be clean. Mindful of the Colombian military’s poor record on human rights and its ties with the paramilitaries, the US Congress insisted - upon the introduction of Plan Colombia - that all Colombians trained for U.S.-backed battalions be vetted on human rights standards and be certified that Colombia’s military is severing its ties with the paramilitaries. Yet despite evidence of only limited progress, the White House has repeatedly issued the required certification and released Plan Colombia funds. The United States pays lip service to international protocol while turning its back on them to further its own interests. Many States in South America have decried Washington’s unilateral approach and militaristic attitudes.
Every Latin American government recognizes the depth of Colombia’s problems and its need for outside support. Yet U.S. aid, which will reach $1.6 billion over the next two years, has provoked wide opposition in the region. The first concern is that U.S. funds, most of which are meant for the purchase of military hardware to battle drug traffickers, will escalate Colombia’s wars and end hopes for a negotiated settlement with the country’s guerrillas. This would be an unwelcome outcome, for negotiation remains the solution favored by every Latin American government, despite the continual failure of peace talks. Latin American nations are not the only ones seeking a more viable multilateral approach to the Colombian conflict. The European Union has been advocating a peaceful solution to the Colombian conflict for decades. Their position is more reflective of liberal theory, and its promotion of non militaristic solutions and reliance on international instruments of cooperation. The European Union has been most instrumental in facilitating negotiations in the conflict. In 2002, the EU was involved in talks between the Urribe government and rebels regarding land that was to be handed over to the rebels for their own autonomy and sanctuary. When the previous administration of Carlos Pastrana was having difficulties relaunching the San Francisco de la Sombra agreement (establishing the need for a ceasefire), the EU was there to help bring both sides to the negotiating table.
However, even the EU has run out of patience with the ineffectiveness of American policy in Colombia. The institutionalization of Plan Colombia has created a division between America and the EU. On one hand, you have the Americans and their Colombian allies who view the conflict through a specific mind frame and feel the solution to the conflict can be achieved in one manner only. On the other hand, you have an international consensus, best exemplified by the EU and Latin American nations that feel a multilateral, non militaristic solution is the only viable outcome. On both sides, there is a mutual disdain for the others positions. There are two ideologies at work here, and both of them offer drastically different solutions based on different approaches.
The EU is opposed to Plan Colombia because they have recognized it for what it is: Consolidation of power on behalf of the Colombian government. They do not recognize this approach as contributing to peace in any way. Representatives of the European Parliament have reaffirmed their view that Plan Colombia is a war project, not a peace program, and have insisted that the EU should not become involved. The differences between the EU and the US are not limited to the framework of Plan Colombia but its objectives and actions. The EU has difficulty understanding the objectives of an operation that borders on interference in the internal affairs of another country. Such blatant interference by the United States is seen as counter productive and unjustified in the quest for peace. The two sides also see the inherent causes of the conflict to be different. While the US and its Colombian allies have focused on the security issue, for the EU government corruption, social injustice, and the abandonment of State obligations are signaled as causes of the crisis.
The Europeans understand the role of America as not only the lone superpower but as the dominant force in the Western Hemisphere. However, they object to the way they have been relegated as inferior partners in the peace process. America in its pursuit of its own objectives has dismissed other actors who are not necessarily fully supportive of their plans. This dismissal takes on many forms: Ignoring input from other nations, not allowing other nations to take part properly in the peace process, relegating other actors to marginal roles and duties, and worst of all, expecting others to not only go along with American plans but to assist in them as well.
When the overt militaristic aspects of Plan Colombia became known, the EU reacted in disbelief, believing that the plan was in direct opposition to Europe’s plans for peace. The EU’s opposition to Plan Colombia was four fold: One, the militaristic character of the plan. Two, the lack of linkage with other aspects of Colombian civil society. Three, the lack of recognition for the “Paramilitary phenomenon”. Finally, drastic social and economic reforms integral to rebel demands were completely ignored. The final insult was that despite overwhelming European objections to the Plan, the United States still wanted the EU to maintain its financial commitments. In essence, the EU government perceived that they were called upon to pay the expenses of a war they did not perpetrate, expand or worsen. Not surprisingly, the EU’s efforts to further peace talks has subsided, and in doing so, it has dealt a blow to a greater international consensus to further peace talks.
Multilateral approaches, having never taken hold properly, now see no place for themselves in a Colombia dominated by American and Colombian State military operations. The European Union not only disagrees with the objectives and nature of the plan but refuse to cooperate with it, as they realize it is ineffective. Since the start of hostilities in Colombia, the Americans have had a specific set of objectives framed within a specific context. The Americans have sought to crush the rebel movement as best they can, and have framed this war within a greater context of geopolitical strategies. In doing so, they have at best barely acknowledged the root causes of the conflict, the enemy with which they are dealing, and have prevented any viable negotiation from taking place. This is despite overwhelming international and regional consensus regarding the need for negotiations and the role of third party actors in facilitating these negotiations. Their own specific interest takes precedent over international norms and protocols.
This realist theoretical framework has been the biggest obstacle to more liberal approaches from the EU which recognizes the fallacies of a military solution. In conclusion, there needs to be a fundamental alteration of American foreign policy regarding Colombia. Major renovations must be made, and this requires a shift in thinking and intentions. The “War on Drugs” must be called off as its ineffectiveness has been exposed. Furthermore, the paramilitaries associated with the government (as well as some of the most human rights violations) must be disarmed and brought to justice, and finally a serious effort is required to bring both sides to the negotiating table. This can only be facilitated by multilateral efforts, either through international institutions such as the UN, or regional players such as the OAS. These efforts towards peace can only occur when America relinquishes its hold over Colombia, as only then can the UN and OAS achieve plausible and legitimate results. Failure to do so will almost certainly extend the conflict in Colombia not only years into the future, but into neighboring nations as well.

By Abdul Karim

Northern Rock customers withdraw £2 Billion

Since Friday, people with accounts with Northern Rock have withdrawn almost £2bn. The firm is also preparing itself for more withdrawals in coming days.
Long queues were the scene outside many Northern Rock branches across the UK as worried shareholders joined extremely long queues to take out their money. Northern Rock almost sold itself to it’s rival Lloyds TSB before going cap-in-hand to the Bank of England (BoE) asking for emergency funds. The deal with Lloyds TSB fell through because of the difficulty of borrowing money in the current financial climate.
The £2bn withdrawn represents the 8% of the £24bn deposits the bank held on Thursday, this is a lot less than what mortgage lenders and officials at the BoE feared. More money is expected to be withdrawn in the coming days, especially from those holding Northern Rock’s postal accounts.
FSA, the City watchdog, has backed comments from the Treasury saying it is confident that the Northern Rock is solvent and that savers could continue to deposit and withdraw funds:

“To be absolutely clear, if we believed Northern Rock was not solvent, we would not have allowed it to remain open for business” - FSA Chairman Callum McCarthy

“ I expect that in a year’s time, Northern Rock will not exist. As a brand it is shot” Justin Urquhart Stewart (analyst)

 The situation turned political today as Cameron blamed the Brown led Labour party for the Banks problems, saying that various taxes and charges brought into place by Brown, when he was head of the exchequer in Blair’s party, have damaged Northern Rock “beyond repair”

Peter Self

Sunday, 9 September 2007

New Writer!

The sixth writer to join the team is Dan Thompson. Dan is a great friend of mine and has agreed to help out with the site. Dan is interested in politics to express his own views, whether they are one sided or not. Expect some hardhitting facts from this guy! He is not afraid to express his own views and will be looking into the policies regarding recreational drug use and scientific research into controlled substances.

Iraq Update: Britain withdraws from Basra, whilst US surge continues, as Chemical Ali is sentanced to hang

Iraq has reached a fork in the road that it was bound to meet for a long time. The 550 British troops that were based in the centre of Basra at Basra palace, have withdrawn to Basra International Airport, awaiting departure to Kuwait to act as a 'force over the horizon'. Talks between the British and Kuwaiti governments over Britain opening a base where a QRF (Quick Reaction Force) can be opened are still on-going. The move which was greeted by disdain from US Army commanders is a crucial blow to Bush. Although the Americans did admit that they knew this was going to happen, sooner rather than later, it is no doubt a huge blow to Bush who needs British military and political support in Iraq. There was a lot of ‘transatlantic’ bickering between the two countries over their different policies in Iraq. For instance a Pentagon official said the reason for British withdraw from Basra was simply because of pressure at home, rather than in Iraq. General Michael Jackson, the man who led British forces into Iraq, blamed Roosevelt and his commanders for the failures so far. However, senior American defence officials have called for a stop to this game.

“ A very senior defence official has told the joint chief's of Staff that the sniping against Britain must stop” - Sources from Washington

American critiscm was met by anger, from the commander of the 4th Rifles Battle-groups, Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick Sanders:

“Does this look like it’s a defeated army? No, it’s complete bullocks! Arguably, the peace and quiet we’re seeing in Basra at the moment is because we fought them to the negotiating table”

Questions have been raised about who exactly the British have agreed plans with, but late last week the British have admitted to having held talks with the militias, which is something the Americans are doing at the moment (continue reading)

“We talk to the Mahdi Army and other militia groups in our area of operations as part of the stragedy of political engagement we have long pursued. The Mahdi Army clearly has an interest in and influence over Basra and the rest of Iraq, and an outright refusal to engage in dialogue with them would not be in Iraq’s, or Basra’s best interest” - (MOD)

“It was the British who came to us in the first place to strike a deal, they wanted us to stop attacking their compounds and troops. It was not the Mahdi Army that went to them. It was obvious to us that they had suffered enough attacks and could not deal with more” - (A senior Mahdi Army official putting a new spin onto the story)

Mahdi Army leaders had agreed to cease all attacks on two conditions:

“First that they release our men and prisoners and then that they withdraw totally from Basra City itself. Eventually the British agreed to our demands and released nine Mahdi men, some of whom were senior commanders. They also promised to hand over the others to the Iraqi courts, which we will not charge our men”

Soon, Bush will present his report to congress on whether the US 'surge' in numbers has infact worked or not. Statistics from the Times do show a decrease in deaths and violence, but this is from a very high number of deaths, abut Sunnis are still being forced from Iraq because of sectarian violence.
Iraqi civilian deaths have fallen from 4,000 to 3,500 since the Surge, US troops being killed has had a sharp decrease going from 110 to 59, Internally displaced people (cumulative) has rising to 1.5 million and the US troops in Iraq has increased from the annual average of 140,000 to 161,000.
The US has also adopted new tactics. The most successful so far, is that they are paying insurgents to promise to back the US military. A contradiction to most Western leaders strongly backed line which is "Never pay or support terrorists to maintain their goal, no matter what" This is what they are doing! They are backing down to insurgents, albeit former insurgents, and paying them money. Who is also to say that these insurgent groups will stop killing coalition forces? Are the Americans sure that the same insurgent groups who have been bombing them since 2003 aren’t about to use American tax-payed money to create bigger and better bombs, to kill more American troops? I always feel never trust or support terrorism, and i am very surprised at the new American policy.
In the Times there is a photo of Captain Henry Moltz of the 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment kissing Sheikh Sabah Al-Janabi, I obviously can’t say that Al-Janabi is either a honest or dishonest man, but you do get a sense of feeling that some of these kisses that the American commanders are giving out will mean as much as Judas kissing Jesus.
In other news Ali Hassan al-Majid, also known as Chemical Ali, has been sentenced to hang for uses of chemical weapons against Saddam Hussein’s enemies. He is due to be hanged in Baghdad later this week, before the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan. He was convicted of killing 180,000 Kurd with chemical weapons ni the 1980’s, he lost his appeal last week. He is currently under American custody, awaiting transfer the Iraqi’s for execution. He is the cousin of Saddam and is the most important official to be executed since his cousin was hanged last December.

Tuesday, 4 September 2007

TPN's revamp

The reason i have not been posting recently is two-fold. Firstly, i have had some time issues and secondly i've decided to revamp the site.
Unfortunaly due to the linear structure of blogspot and me not being very computer savvy i can't really play around with the site and make it excatly what i want it to be. However, i've decided am going to make the following changes:

i) Shorter posts
ii) Less posts on the main page (max 10)
iii) A video-feedback function for additional media

Although i can't change it, i've had some e-mails asking about how to leave comments. It's simple, you just scroll down to the bottom of the article you are reading, and click on the highlighted 'comments' section, which will then take you to a new page where you can write some comments.
The video function is exciting me at the moment, am just playing with the idea. Again copy and paste the URL i deliver and then you can watch my videos. They will be getting better as i get to grips with Imovie technology and be more confident. Also if you want to post a video please e-mail them to self29@hotmail.com
Thanks for your continued support!
Peter Self

Monday, 3 September 2007

new video

file:///Users/peter/Desktop/Teen%20politics/MOV07360.MPG