The many faces of the Taliban make a military based peace impossible. In retrospect, the Americans can be forgiven for their near sightedness five years ago. When the US led coalition began its war in Afghanistan in 2001 following the 9/11 attacks, it was easy to be optimistic. The Americans rained death from the skies, as town after town fell to the US allied Northern Alliance. Within weeks the Taliban regime was no more, its members either defeated, defected or re assimilated within the civilian social structures of the country. A few Taliban retreated to the mountains, their calls for a renewed sustained guerilla war laughingly dismissed by pundits and politicians alike.
Fast forward five years, and we have a vicious insurgency that shows no signs of abating. At least ¼ of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces have a heavy Taliban presence, while almost half the country is under the sway of Taliban law and gun. The government controls the urban centers and the Coalition controls the roads when their patrols make their rounds. But it is when the sun sets, within the rural parts of the country which are home to the majority of Afghans, that the Taliban re emerge. In many parts of the south, locals take their disputes to Taliban courts, as opposed to government judiciary institutions. Those with grievances avoid the corrupt Afghan police, a despised and mistrusted force, instead seeking redress from the Taliban. Curfews, laws (in some parts, the use of motored vehicles have been banned) and edicts are strictly enforced by the Talibs. In most of the south and east of the county, aid agency presence is virtually non existent, and schools remain empty.
Mistakes Made.
It wasn’t always like this. For the first year or two after the Taliban were toppled, the south and east maintained a calm if uneasy peace. After nearly 3 decades of war, the population was exhausted and weary of fighting. Local Pashtun tribes had replaced the authority of the Taliban, and the Karzai regime (and by extension, the US led Coalition) was given a chance to prove itself. Unfortunately, it failed to do so, for reasons now painstakingly clear. The country was returned to the same warlords the Taliban had replaced, much to the chagrin of locals. The authorities turned a blind eye to the resurgent poppy growth, creating a black market that severely undermined the authority of Kabul. Coalition reliance on air strikes, coupled with cultural insensitivity (the use of dogs, forced entrance into private homes) slowly turned the tide of public opinion against the Kabul regime. Funds allocated for aid and reconstruction were a pittance compared to vast sums squandered on the Coalition war machinery. Furthermore, there was no serious attempt at a national reconciliation that included all forces, namely the Taliban. The Guantanamo debacle did not help matters either. (We now know, that the vast majority of inmates held at the US prison were either completely innocent, or low level soldiers of inconsequential importance, sold into American custody by overzealous Bounty Hunters often relying on tips from locals that were based on local rivalries and outright greed.) Finally, there were some Afghans that required no further motivation for anti government resistance other than the presence of foreigners on Afghan soil.
Original Taliban
Different reasons for discontent lead to different motivations for fighting, which in turn have created different types of Taliban. The original Taliban were an organized cohesive movement. It was a top-down administration, with power heavily centralized around the Kandahar based 10 member Shura Council, the head of which was the Amir Ul Mumineen (“Commander of the Faithful”) Mullah Mohamed Omar. Omar created the Taliban in 1994, out of the ashes of the defunct Mujahideen forces who fought the Soviets. Tired of the lawlessness and the criminality of the corrupt war criminals that controlled the countryside, Omar organized a band of vigilantes that sought to restore order under the Islamic Shariah Law. It had a strong leadership, a very clear and direct ideology, and an administrative system that was able to implement and maintain directives. Within four years, it controlled more than 80% of the country. More importantly, it was a movement that consisted of many pragmatic forces. Although its ideology was a strict puritanical form of Islam, the group contained many diverse voices within it. Some Taliban were influenced by the Saudi Wahhabi dogma, while others advocated the return of the former King, Zahir Shah. The Taliban also had a large moderate wing, led by the Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil and based around the Foreign Ministry, which often clashed with the Al Qaeda guests and their Talib hosts.
It was a movement that could have been negotiated with (as the Americans did, albeit briefly). It is a pity of the Afghan war, that this option was not pursued seriously in Washington. Although its extremist policies were detested by the majority of the populace, to its credit, the Taliban were able to restore law and order, and drastically reduce crime in a country that months ago was a scene of anarchy.
Many Faces
The current Taliban is not a cohesive organization, but rather a network of different interests and groups that have come together under the “Taliban” umbrella. While there is a central leadership consisting of former senior Taliban officials, their reach and influence is severely restricted and they do not command the loyalty of all Taliban. Some Taliban are remnants of the old regime, while others are simply patriotic Afghans fighting against the foreign occupiers and have little ties to the Taliban leadership. Some of the fighters are allied with former warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb E Islami faction that are nominally loyal to the Taliban. There are those Taliban that are simply hired guards for Drug Kingpins seeking to keep the government (which has made a quasi attempt at poppy eradication) at bay. Many insurgents have been driven into the arms of the Taliban, because of an oppressive and corrupt local administration. Many Afghans dread passing a government or police checkpoint, as this results in harassment, theft or worse. Some Taliban are simply mercenaries fighting for pay (insurgents apparently received up to five times the monthly wage an Afghan policeman makes). Finally, there are Taliban that are allied with remnants of Al Qaeda (Arab, Chechen and Uzbek jihadists) based out of the Pakistani Tribal Areas.
Inter Taliban Conflict
Further complicating matters, are internal strains and disagreements. One inter Taliban conflict of note, is taking place in the autonomous Tribal Areas of Pakistan, between local tribes and foreign jihadists and their patrons. The foreigners, once welcomed as guests and comrades, have angered the locals through their military attacks that have resulted in huge civilian casualties. Furthermore, these jihadists have launched a series of assassination attempts against local elders who oppose their presence or who have contacts with the Pakistani Army (The Army has flooded the Waziristan tribal region with over 80,000 troops in the last 2-3 years, resulting in over 700 Pakistani casualties, and claims of heavy handedness and persecution by the locals). There are also rivalries among different commanders who are vouching for leadership of the Pakistani based Taliban, especially since the death in 2004 of a senior Taliban leader, Nek Mohammed.
Tribal Rivalries
An additional complication, is the fratricidal tribal politics of the Pashtun people. The largest tribal confederacy in the world, the Pashtun occupy both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border and overwhelmingly make up the Taliban. Divided into thousands of tribes, sub tribes and clans, tribal politics has always been a presence of Pashtun society. These tribal rivalries exist within the framework of a larger anti American/Afghan government/Pakistani insurgency. For example, in the Kandahar region, the Achakzais and Noorzai tribes have had a rivalry for decades. When the Kabul government appointed a major Achakzai militia leader as head of security (ostensibly to fight the Taliban), the Noorzai populace revolted. When the Achakzai official called in government troops, the Noorzai turned to the Taliban. This government- Taliban dichotomy has played out across the Pashtun heartlands, as tribes choose their affiliations based on the actions of their rivals.
Conclusion
It is in this context, that the Taliban insurgency currently plays out. One need not be an expert on Afghanistan to understand a military solution to this problem is impossible. Any solution to the conflict in Afghanistan requires a multi faceted approach, involving five key processes. First, the police and local administrations in the east and south need to be dismantled, and rebuilt with better training and an integration of tribes and localities currently alienated from the political process. Retraining will involve not only a military training to better equip and prepare the forces, but also to prevent the corrupt and criminal elements from provoking a civilian backlash that will increase Taliban sympathy. One cannot underestimate how important it is, in post war societies to establish the rule of law and by extension the writ and authority of the central government. Second, a serious dialogue must be created with the Taliban, or at least those Taliban that are susceptible to negotiations. Create a forum for the airing of grievances, and create the necessary institutions to implement solutions to these concerns.
Allow for the entry of moderate factions of the Taliban into the government, as this would alleviate Pashtun concerns about the current ethnic makeup of the regime which is notable for a lack of Pashtun representation (the Pashtun are Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, and the traditional power brokers). Third, while these processes are being pursued, create a timetable for the military withdrawal of the US led coalition. The presence of these troops on Afghan soil create resentment amongst the xenophobic Pashtuns, and lend credence to Taliban propaganda that the Coalition is a colonizing entity. The military withdrawal of the Coalition should be matched by an increase in civilian and administrative personnel, institutions and funding in order to increase aid and reconstruction in Afghanistan. The Afghan people are naturally pessimistic of outsiders and need to see concrete proof of their good intentions. There is no better proof, than paved roads, hospitals and schools.
Fourth, the Coalition and its allies must realize that Poppy production cannot be eliminated over night. In the short term, poppy growth must be legalized for medicinal purposes, and brought under the control and administration of the government. This would eliminate the black market economy, drug kingpins and militias, as well as the exploitation of poppy growers, without targeting their livelihood. Agricultural subsidization policies should be subsequently pursued, in order to provide a motivation for farmers to start investing in other goods and products. Finally, there needs to be an increased cooperation between Afghan and Pakistani officials over the disputed border region, in the form of committees and consistent meetings. Local tribal authority figures need to be strengthened and re established following years of Taliban attacks upon it. Concentrated aid and funding in this region will assist in this regard.
Afghanistan- the launch pad of George Bush’s War on Terror, and the region Tony Blair called the key to global security in the 21st Century- is in danger of being lost. Now is not the time for simple minded solutions. The world has born witness to what occurred the last time Afghanistan was left to its own destructive machinations, we cannot afford to make that mistake again.
BY PolKarim
ABDUL KARIM
posted by PolSelf
