Iraq: If you break it, you own it

When the Americans launched the disastrously planned and ironically named “Operation Iraqi Freedom” more than four years ago, the only enemy they anticipated was the Iraqi army, a military force in name only. Mostly made up of conscripted Shias who were more inclined to shoot their general rather then any invader, the Iraqi Armed Forces were far from the potent military machine Saddam Hussein created to face the Iranians in the 1980’s. Its nuclear ambitions had long been stunted, first by the 1981 Israeli air strike on the Osirak nuclear reactor, and later by back to back regional conflicts. Its chemical weapons, put to good use against Kurds and Iranian troops, had for the most part been destroyed by UN weapons inspectors or had expired. The Army’s infrastructure had been devastated by repeated wars, and the decade long UN sanctions crippled any rearmament efforts. So it was no surprise when the American troops faced more defections then resistance as it strolled into Baghdad.
Second Phase
Soon after, we were introduced to the second phase of fighting in Iraq, courtesy of the Iraqi insurgency. At the time, few in the West were familiar with the assortment of tribes, sects, ethnicities and factions that made up the resistance. Initially dismissed as the work of rogues and remnants of the previous regime, it wasn’t long before the insurgency had become an Iraqi institution. Over time, we became familiar with the Zawahiris and the Sadrs, the Saddamists and the Jihadists.
Unfortunately, we also became more familiar with a rising civilian body count as central Iraq burned day and night. Lost in the midst of Mission Accomplished banners and beheading videos were quiet developments occurring in the streets of Baghdad. Bodies were being turned into Baghdad morgues that displayed neither the marks of a shootout victim nor a casualty of air strikes. Day after day, a climate of fear began taking over Sunni neighbourhoods, as an increasing number of former Baathist officials began disappearing.
Third Phase
Having failed to anticipate an insurgency, the incompetent Pentagon brass could hardly have been expected to anticipate what began 4 years ago and continues unabated today: the vengeance of the Shias. Long oppressed and marginalized by Saddam’s Sunni regime (and for centuries prior by the Ottomans), the majority Shia had been emancipated and now relished the opportunity to settle scores. In the Middle East, where honour and pride is worth more than life itself to the patriarchal tribal society, vengeance is a cultural institution. Skirmishes became gun battles, gun battles became all out assaults. And when the second of two bombs went off at the Al Askari Shia shrine in Basra on that fateful February day in 2006, all hell broke loose. Mosques attacked, preachers and priests killed, the indiscriminate targeting of civilians, the ethnic cleansing of neighbourhoods, the forming of militias and the complete breakdown of law and order followed in the next few months. The success of the Shia death squads led to increasingly desperate tactics by the outgunned and outnumbered Sunnis; car bombs in market places, suicide bombings at festivals and even attacks on religious and funeral processions. The third phase of fighting in Iraq had set dangerous new precedents.
Fourth Phase
It seems as if things couldn’t get any worse in Iraq. US troops are stuck in what is increasingly seen as an unwinnable quagmire while the political climate in Washington and London is not as favourable to the war as it once was. Nouri al Maliki’s governing coalition has lost its Sunni partners, all governmental institutions are either despised or distrusted and Baghdad has become inner city Los Angeles on steroids. The Turks are licking their chops in the north, eager to set its troops on the Kurdish peshmergas, while not a day goes by without a US official repeating claims of Iranian interference in Iraq. And yet, things are getting worse. The next chapter of the Iraq war is sure to be bloodier than the previous. A fourth dimension of Iraq fighting has emerged: inter-sect warfare.
Last week another 50-60 Iraqis were killed in the southern holy city of Karbala, as the Shia celebrated the birth of their last Imam. Two years ago such an attack would have led to finger pointing and condemnation of Al Qaeda and other likeminded extremist Sunnis.
Inter Shia Strife
We now know that the casualties were the result of a gun battle between the two largest Shia militias in Iraq: the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades. The two groups have a rivalry that extends to the upper echelon of its leadership. The Mahdi Army is led by Moqtada Al Sadr, while the Badr Brigades are the military wing of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC) led by Abdul Aziz al Hakim. The Hakim-Sadr rivalry goes back decades, as both families have jostled for leadership of the Iraqi Shia community. Both factions received support from Iran, although the SIIC curries more favour in Tehran (the SIIC was based out of Iran for years while Saddam was in power). While Sadr has crafted a popular image of himself as a firebrand cleric opposed to the occupation, the SIIC has sought political power from the onset of the war and has deeply integrated itself within the government, both politically and militarily (including heavy infiltration of the government’s security apparatus). Thus, Sadr remains a populist, appealing to the poor and impoverished while the SIIC represents the new Shia establishment. The Mahdi Army-SIIC rivalry now exists in Baghdad and the entire Shia south, where both groups are vying for power. Further contributing to the deteriorating situation in the south, is the imminent withdrawal of British troops from the region as well as the close proximity of Basra and surrounding regions (which is responsible for more than half of Iraq’s oil) to the Iranian border. Criminal gangs, with no specific political affiliation, also command great strength.
Inter Sunni Strife
Until recently, the Sunni insurgency maintained a united front in the face of their two major threats, the Americans and the Shias. However, developments in the last two years have led to a schism within the Sunni resistance, as both sides attempt to consolidate their power over the Iraqi Sunni community. In general terms, the conflict within the community is between a radical internationalist jihad movement with local support and a more nationalist Iraqi based resistance. The former is headed by the Islamic State in Iraq, while the latter movement is being championed by the Reform and Jihad Front (RJF). The Islamic State in Iraq is an attempt by Al Qaeda in Iraq to create a quasi government, with ministries and a leadership committee called the Mujahideen Shura Council. The group itself is an amalgamation of Al Qaeda and several smaller groups that share Al Qaeda’s extremist Salafi ideology. The Islamic State in Iraq is made up of both foreign fighters as well as local networks of support. Initially supported by the other Sunni insurgent groups for its tactical success in the battlefield against the Americans, the ISI has since alienated many Sunnis from its cause as a result of its ideology and actions. The ISI has branded Iraq’s Shia community as heretics and government supporters, and has thus targeted the community with indiscriminate attacks that have taken the lives of thousands of civilians. Not only are the secreterian attacks frowned upon by many other Sunni insurgents, but Shia reprisals usually occur against Sunni villages and neighbourhoods. Furthermore, the Islamic State of Iraq has attempted to impose its harsh interpretation of Islamic law in the Sunni heartland, targeting those who attempt to oppose its consolidation of power. The arrogance and insensitivity of the foreigners has led to the creation of a more nationalist, pragmatist Sunni insurgent coalition.
The Reform and Jihad Front is a coalition led by the Islamic Army of Iraq, one of the biggest insurgent groups and a onetime ally of Al Qaeda. Primarily consisting of native Iraqis, the RJF are less inclined to take part in secretarian acts of violence and seek to protect the interests of the Sunni community within the existing framework (the current government). Thus, there have been some degree of communication at the political level between the Iraqi government and the RJF, a though that is tantamount to betrayal for the more hardcore ISI. While the Sunni insurgency overwhelmingly opposed the government in the beginning of the war, a vast number of Sunnis have realized that they live in a new Iraq, where their community has become a minority, and thus political integration is a necessary evil. Initial attempts to suppress inter-Sunni rivalries have failed miserably, and both sides have openly declared the other an enemy.
The Tribes
The extremist ideology of the Islamic State in Iraq leaves no room for flexibility, negotiation and reform. All who oppose their viewpoints are declared an obstacle to their organization. As a result, local Sunnis who have objected to the group’s hardcore initiatives and military tactics have felt the wrath. In an attempt to stifle dissent, as well as create a power vacuum that they can fill, the ISI has targeted local Sunni tribal chiefs who have opposed their administration. After dozens of assassinations and casualties, the Sunni tribes of central Iraq have created their own military organizations to specifically counter the Al Qaeda threat. In the Sunni Al Anbar province - home of the Sunni insurgency - the tribes have created the Anbar Salvation Council (ASC). The full complexities of the Iraq war is best exemplified by the fact that the American government now actively arms the same tribes that it once targeted. The enemy of my enemy is my friend, indeed. The successes of the ASC has translated into similar organizations sprouting all over the Sunni heartland, most recently in Diyala province with the establishment of the Diyala Salvation Front.
Conclusion
Although the Americans may be pleased that the Sunni and Shia insurgency it once struggled to contain has split, one must not be too optimistic. Iran holds a great deal of influence over the Iraqi Shia community, and is in a position to facilitate a reconciliation between the rival factions. In regards to the Sunni strife, the Iraqi government has been less than enthusiastic about arming the Sunni tribes, even if it means the defeat of Al Qaeda. While the Sunni insurgents consider Al Qaeda its foremost enemy now, the Shia and American threat has not been ignored. There are legitimate fears in both Baghdad and Washington, that the same tribes and groups it supports now, will turn on it as soon as Al Qaeda is defeated. Furthermore, the inter-sect conflicts have contributed to a further polarization of the Iraqi people, and a greater militarization of the populace. When the Americans broke the Iraqi piñata, they misjudged what would emerge from within it.
Anticipating a supportive and willing populace, they now face a multitude of enemies and allies whose trust today cannot be ensured tomorrow. Perhaps this situation is what Colin Powell referred to, when he told President Bush pre war, that having owned Iraq, the United States would inherit all its problems. “If you break it, you own it”, the saying goes. The Americans would love to clean up this mess but it may be too late. Besides, even if they could, it remains to be seen whether the Iraqis themselves will let them.

By Abdul Karim