Columbia: The Never Ending Story

America’s insistence on a militaristic approach in the 1990’s has not only harmed any multilateral approach to resolving the conflict, but has exasperated the violent status quo in Columbia.
For nearly four decades, war has raged across Colombia. It is the forgotten war, the war that has existed for so long; its continued eternal existence is assumed. Long after the flames of other Latin American civil conflicts have been extinguished, the Colombian inferno continues to burn. It is the longest running conflict in the world today, and its continual perpetuation boggles the mind. Although there have been multilateral efforts to stop the war and promote negotiations, these efforts have been hampered and delegitimized by America’s role as regional super power and de facto Colombian power broker for the last six decades. The relationship between international institutions such as the UN and the Colombian government has been less then solid, and the ability of the UN to interfere in Colombia has been severely restricted.
There is a sharp difference between the interests of the Americans in Colombia and the desires of the international community advocating a multilateral approach. This divergence of interests reflects two theoretical perspectives. The Americans, with their policy of State involvement and looking after geopolitical interests have pursued policies with a realist perspective, whereas the international community, notably the European Union in seeking to mediate the conflict have assumed a more idealist view point.
The current American foreign policy towards Colombia - in the form of “Plan Colombia” and in conjunction with its Colombian government allies - sustains the current violence and prolongs the conflict with its militaristic approach. This policy is based on American geopolitical strategies and interests, and as a result prevents any viable multilateral approach from taking place. It is only when the lone superpower decides to relinquish authority and compromise its influence that a united multilateral push for peace can be achieved. The United States must understand that if conflict still rages in Colombia after four decades, then the attitudes and approaches to that nation must be drastically altered to prevent further deterioration and disaster.
A brief history of the conflict is necessary to situate our arguments within a broader context. The Colombian civil war began in the late 1960’s. Over the course of the last four decades, the war, its actors and the mechanisms by which the war was fought (as well as external factors) has evolved drastically. A clear, fluid, transitional, historical review of the war will not serve much good as the Colombian State and its rebel enemies as well as the nation’s international standing has changed. However, the root causes of the conflict still to this day remain because it has never been addressed by the Colombian State. More than 65% of the citizens of Colombia live in poverty. Furthermore, 30% of landowners control more than 90% of the land.
The conflict began when leftist activists sympathetic with Maoist/Communist ideology began rebelling against the State in the late 60’s. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was established in 1966 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. The National Liberation Army (ELN) was formed in the 1960’s, inspired by the actions of Fidel Castro in Cuba. Together, these militant groups seeked to establish a communist State in Colombia and have sought to do so by force of arms over the last four decades. Together, they currently control half of the country. More than half of the nation’s mayors support or obey them. Their administration of area under their control includes regulation of laws, execution of criminal justice, patrolling the roads and highways, and other forms of governance.
The Cold War was fought between the United States and the Soviet Union all over the world and South America was no exception. The US policy in South America was guided primarily by one objective: the containment and suppression of communism. This involved support of anti communist regimes and active involvement in the affairs of other States to eradicate any leftist, socialist movements that would upset the anti communist balance of power. Examples of this Cold War policy include the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile (1973) and the support for anti-leftist “contras” in Nicaragua (1980’s). In Colombia, the United States has been instrumental in the State’s battles against the FARC/ELN since the conflict began. Although the extent of American involvement has differed throughout the last four decades, the main components of American policy have remained intact, namely financial and military aid for the Colombian State.
The latest chapter in this conflict has been the American governments re-energized efforts to become more involved in the Colombian affair. This increased involvement started in the late 1990’s when President Bill Clinton introduced “Plan Colombia”, a coordinated effort by the American and Colombian regimes to crack down on the leftist militants through increased aid and military assistance. “Plan Colombia” promotes a military approach to the conflict, and its proponents believe violence will bring stability to Colombia. Think a scaled down Marshall Plan - except, replace aid with guns.
“Plan Colombia” was designed to increase stability and order in Colombia, however its supporters believe this can only be achieved after the conflict is resolved militarily. A new consensus had emerged in Washington that neither alternative development nor political, economic, or judicial reform is possible in Colombia until the State first starts providing permanent security throughout the country, which is three times the size of California. Doing so, however, will require a massive counterinsurgency campaign. Once American money, equipment, and advisers headed to Colombia, it would be only a matter of time before the United States began openly supporting the counterinsurgency campaign against the FARC and the ELN. The establishment of geopolitical spheres of influence (South America as America’s backyard), recognition of policy objectives based on State centered “interests” (containing non friendly communist movements) and overt militaristic approach to solving these issues reflects the realist bent of American foreign policy.
“Plan Colombia” was accepted by the Colombian government but the region was less willing to embrace such a policy. The U.S. effort to build regional support for a military campaign in Colombia is further complicated by skepticism about Washington’s motivation for expanding its already significant military presence. The U.S. armed forces are widely regarded as having been complicit in years of repression. Given the extreme weakness of democracy in the region, legitimate fear exists across the continent that if Washington makes stronger ties to local militaries a priority, it will only strengthen the very institutions that are most associated with the authoritarian rule of recent decades.
The United States may espouse democratic ideals and values and even be willing to go to war to defend them; however it has no qualms about restricting it to further their interests. Similarly, while the United States may publicly call for respect for human rights, its track record in Colombia suggests otherwise. In a conflict marred by gross human rights violations committed by militias on both sides of the conflict, no form of American involvement would be clean. Mindful of the Colombian military’s poor record on human rights and its ties with the paramilitaries, the US Congress insisted - upon the introduction of Plan Colombia - that all Colombians trained for U.S.-backed battalions be vetted on human rights standards and be certified that Colombia’s military is severing its ties with the paramilitaries. Yet despite evidence of only limited progress, the White House has repeatedly issued the required certification and released Plan Colombia funds. The United States pays lip service to international protocol while turning its back on them to further its own interests. Many States in South America have decried Washington’s unilateral approach and militaristic attitudes.
Every Latin American government recognizes the depth of Colombia’s problems and its need for outside support. Yet U.S. aid, which will reach $1.6 billion over the next two years, has provoked wide opposition in the region. The first concern is that U.S. funds, most of which are meant for the purchase of military hardware to battle drug traffickers, will escalate Colombia’s wars and end hopes for a negotiated settlement with the country’s guerrillas. This would be an unwelcome outcome, for negotiation remains the solution favored by every Latin American government, despite the continual failure of peace talks. Latin American nations are not the only ones seeking a more viable multilateral approach to the Colombian conflict. The European Union has been advocating a peaceful solution to the Colombian conflict for decades. Their position is more reflective of liberal theory, and its promotion of non militaristic solutions and reliance on international instruments of cooperation. The European Union has been most instrumental in facilitating negotiations in the conflict. In 2002, the EU was involved in talks between the Urribe government and rebels regarding land that was to be handed over to the rebels for their own autonomy and sanctuary. When the previous administration of Carlos Pastrana was having difficulties relaunching the San Francisco de la Sombra agreement (establishing the need for a ceasefire), the EU was there to help bring both sides to the negotiating table.
However, even the EU has run out of patience with the ineffectiveness of American policy in Colombia. The institutionalization of Plan Colombia has created a division between America and the EU. On one hand, you have the Americans and their Colombian allies who view the conflict through a specific mind frame and feel the solution to the conflict can be achieved in one manner only. On the other hand, you have an international consensus, best exemplified by the EU and Latin American nations that feel a multilateral, non militaristic solution is the only viable outcome. On both sides, there is a mutual disdain for the others positions. There are two ideologies at work here, and both of them offer drastically different solutions based on different approaches.
The EU is opposed to Plan Colombia because they have recognized it for what it is: Consolidation of power on behalf of the Colombian government. They do not recognize this approach as contributing to peace in any way. Representatives of the European Parliament have reaffirmed their view that Plan Colombia is a war project, not a peace program, and have insisted that the EU should not become involved. The differences between the EU and the US are not limited to the framework of Plan Colombia but its objectives and actions. The EU has difficulty understanding the objectives of an operation that borders on interference in the internal affairs of another country. Such blatant interference by the United States is seen as counter productive and unjustified in the quest for peace. The two sides also see the inherent causes of the conflict to be different. While the US and its Colombian allies have focused on the security issue, for the EU government corruption, social injustice, and the abandonment of State obligations are signaled as causes of the crisis.
The Europeans understand the role of America as not only the lone superpower but as the dominant force in the Western Hemisphere. However, they object to the way they have been relegated as inferior partners in the peace process. America in its pursuit of its own objectives has dismissed other actors who are not necessarily fully supportive of their plans. This dismissal takes on many forms: Ignoring input from other nations, not allowing other nations to take part properly in the peace process, relegating other actors to marginal roles and duties, and worst of all, expecting others to not only go along with American plans but to assist in them as well.
When the overt militaristic aspects of Plan Colombia became known, the EU reacted in disbelief, believing that the plan was in direct opposition to Europe’s plans for peace. The EU’s opposition to Plan Colombia was four fold: One, the militaristic character of the plan. Two, the lack of linkage with other aspects of Colombian civil society. Three, the lack of recognition for the “Paramilitary phenomenon”. Finally, drastic social and economic reforms integral to rebel demands were completely ignored. The final insult was that despite overwhelming European objections to the Plan, the United States still wanted the EU to maintain its financial commitments. In essence, the EU government perceived that they were called upon to pay the expenses of a war they did not perpetrate, expand or worsen. Not surprisingly, the EU’s efforts to further peace talks has subsided, and in doing so, it has dealt a blow to a greater international consensus to further peace talks.
Multilateral approaches, having never taken hold properly, now see no place for themselves in a Colombia dominated by American and Colombian State military operations. The European Union not only disagrees with the objectives and nature of the plan but refuse to cooperate with it, as they realize it is ineffective. Since the start of hostilities in Colombia, the Americans have had a specific set of objectives framed within a specific context. The Americans have sought to crush the rebel movement as best they can, and have framed this war within a greater context of geopolitical strategies. In doing so, they have at best barely acknowledged the root causes of the conflict, the enemy with which they are dealing, and have prevented any viable negotiation from taking place. This is despite overwhelming international and regional consensus regarding the need for negotiations and the role of third party actors in facilitating these negotiations. Their own specific interest takes precedent over international norms and protocols.
This realist theoretical framework has been the biggest obstacle to more liberal approaches from the EU which recognizes the fallacies of a military solution. In conclusion, there needs to be a fundamental alteration of American foreign policy regarding Colombia. Major renovations must be made, and this requires a shift in thinking and intentions. The “War on Drugs” must be called off as its ineffectiveness has been exposed. Furthermore, the paramilitaries associated with the government (as well as some of the most human rights violations) must be disarmed and brought to justice, and finally a serious effort is required to bring both sides to the negotiating table. This can only be facilitated by multilateral efforts, either through international institutions such as the UN, or regional players such as the OAS. These efforts towards peace can only occur when America relinquishes its hold over Colombia, as only then can the UN and OAS achieve plausible and legitimate results. Failure to do so will almost certainly extend the conflict in Colombia not only years into the future, but into neighboring nations as well.

By Abdul Karim